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squishy@altavista.com

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From: "Carol Briley" <carol.briley@truman.nara.gov>
 Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2000 14:09:27 -0400
 To: <squishy@altavista.com>
 Subject: Re: Truman Press Secretaries

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October 10, 2000

Dear Mr. Cameron:

Thank you for your e-mail of October 10, 2000. There was no press secretary on December 6, 1950. I can send you a copy of the press and radio staff's conference held on the morning of December 6, 1950. Joe Short was later appointed press secretary to replace Ross. We have his papers, but they have not been processed.

We are not aware of a White House situation room existing in 1950. If you send me your mailing address, I will be happy to send you a copy of the conference.

Sincerely,

Carol Briley
 Archivist
 Harry S. Truman Library
 500 West Highway 24
 Independence, MO 64050
 (816) 833-1400, extension 260
 Fax: (816) 833-4368

>>> <squishy@altavista.com> 10/10 10:41 PM >>>
 Carol

On December 5, 1950 Truman's Press Secretary Charles Ross died of a heart attack.

I am very interested in the records that exist for December 6, 1950 as there was a UFO incident that involved an alert. Truman was involved.

I am therefore interested in who was the Press secretary on the 6th, and if this person's records were donated, and if they are processed.

Are there situation room records for the Truman administration which might have a write-up of the events of the morning of the 6th?

Hope you can help. I am planning to be at the Truman Library March 1, 2001. Hopefully I can identify all the boxes I need to see before I get there so I don't have to spend a great deal of time searching finders guides.

Grant

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From: Nick Balaskas <nikolaos@yorku.ca>

Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2000 11:58:52 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time)

To: Grant Cameron <squisshy@altavista.com>

Subject: 50th Anniversary of a UFO Invasion - Balaskas (fwd)

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Hi Grant.

Thanks for the permission. Below is what I just submitted to the UFO UpDates list.

Nick

----- Forwarded message -----

Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2000 11:56:50 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time)

From: Nick Balaskas <nikolaos@yorku.ca>

To: UFO UpDates - Toronto <updates@sympatico.ca>

Organization: York University

Subject: 50th Anniversary of a UFO Invasion - Balaskas

Greetings everyone!

In a few e-mails I got recently I was reminded that on my Name Day, December 6, was the 50th anniversary of an event that nearly brought about World War III but remains little known and still unexplained to this day. What really happened on December 6, 1950?

British Prime Minister Clement Attlee arrived in Washington, D.C. in December 4 with stories in the newspapers of an imminent nuclear attack on the U.S. by the Soviets since the U.S. military under General MacArthur was considering using their nuclear

weapons against Chinese troops during the Korean War.

To quote from one of the e-mails I got from a fellow researcher of the UFO phenomena, on December 5th, President Truman wrote in his diary, "It looks like World War III is here. I hope not - but we must meet whatever comes - and we will." Secretary of State Dean Acheson went to bed thinking that he would not be surprised to be awakened by an announcement of a global war. The following morning all hell seemed to break loose when the U.S. early warning system picked up a formation of unidentified objects flying in over Alaska on a southeast heading towards Washington, D.C. All interception and defense forces were alerted.

As am sure you all know, WWII did not happen that day. The official explanation given was it was a false alarm produced by a flight of geese (this was in the pre-pelican days). Was it something more serious than just birds? I think it was. That same day(?) U.S. military forces, not members of the SPCA, crossed into Mexico just across the border from Texas to recover one of these downed "geese". This UFO crash was confirmed by several credible individuals including a well known Mexican General who was in command of this specific area where the incident occurred.

Many researchers, including Larry Bryant who last year petitioned Mexican officials for more information, have been frustrated in their attempts to find out what the U.S. military did with the UFO wreckage and at least one recovered E.T. alien body.

It is interesting to read that 50 years later there are again increased tensions between Russia and the U.S. over the alleged sinking of the Russian submarine Kursk by the U.S. submarine Memphis. The Russians are expected to probe U.S. defenses in Alaska with their TU-95 bombers as they did during the Cold War years and I suspect I will again hear of many more

stories from friends, one of which is now a Canadian astronaut, about Russian bombers being met by them in their Canadian CF-18 Hornets and escorted back out of our airspace.

If anyone of you has any information, including possible new leads, insights or comments about this UFO crash/retrieval case (Item B-7 on page 22 in Leonard Stringfield's Status Report II), many researchers, including UFO UpDates subscribers and seekers of the truth such as myself, want to know.

Nick Balaskas

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Brad Sparks <RB47Expert@aol.com>

Tue, 12 Dec 2000 17:34:19 EST

Hi Nick,

The radar incident has been found in a number of sources, including diaries of high officials such as Dean Acheson's if I remember right, and there are strange unaccountable discrepancies that no one has been able to resolve. One set of data claims the unidentified aircraft were tracked approaching Maine. Another claims Alaska (as you mentioned). One claims a Dec. 6, 1950, date (if I recall correctly) another is adamant about a Dec. 17 date (if I recall right).

As for the alleged UFO crash, this is the fraudulent Lt Col Willingham story that he later admitted he had fabricated from a rumor he had heard as a boy. It was investigated by Todd Zechel who made a leap in conclusion as great as Moore and Friedman did on Roswell. Moore & Friedman jumped to the conclusion that the Barney Barnett story from Western New Mexico was connected to the Roswell Incident in Eastern New Mexico even though it had no date or even a year. The bogus Barnett story gave them alien bodies and an obvious crashed saucer; the Roswell case gave it all a date. Later they admitted there was no basis for linking these two stories (see MUFON proceedings 1982 and 1985), but by then it was too late, the connection was etched in people's minds.

Zechel likewise jumped to the conclusion that the undated story he got from the Bowen family was connected to Willingham's even though it too was undated. All Zechel knew was that Col John Bowen served as provost marshal at Carswell AFB, Ft. Worth, Tex., 1948-52. Willingham's story had air defense radars purportedly tracking the UFO from Alaska to Washington to a 90-degree turn over Colorado then a crash in Mexico just over the border from Texas (Willingham claimed he flew to the landing site, it was cordoned off, etc.) -- only problem was that there were no air defense radars in Colorado or Texas that could have tracked any such maneuvers until about 1952 or later. But, without a shred of evidence, Zechel connected it all to the FBI document of Dec. 8, 1950, saying the AF had declared an "Immediate High Alert" on reporting flying discs. That gave the dateless floating stories a date.

So Zechel started looking up newspapers around Dec 8, 1950, and

found the news about sightings of contrails in Alaska, Korean War developments of the Chinese entering the war, etc. Eventually the MJ-12 document hoaxers put it all together in the bogus Eisenhower Briefing Document. Because Zechel had reconstructed two different locations and two different approximate dates, the MJ-12 hoaxers picked spots in the middle.

Brad Sparks

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UFO UpDates Mailing List

Re: 50th Anniversary of a UFO Invasion - Maccabee

From: **Bruce Maccabee** <brumac@compuserve.com>
 Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2000 09:45:56 -0500
 Fwd Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2000 11:04:41 +0000
 Subject: Re: 50th Anniversary of a UFO Invasion - Maccabee

>Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2000 11:56:50 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time)
 >From: Nick Balaskas <nikolaos@yorku.ca>
 >To: UFO UpDates - Toronto <updates@sympatico.ca>
 >Subject: 50th Anniversary of a UFO Invasion

>Greetings everyone!

>In a few e-mails I got recently I was reminded that on my Name
 >Day, December 6, was the 50th anniversary of an event that
 >nearly brought about World War III but remains little known and
 >still unexplained to this day. What really happened on December
 >6, 1950?

>British Prime Minister Clement Attlee arrived in Washington,
 >D.C. in December 4 with stories in the newspapers of an imminent
 >nuclear attack on the U.S. by the Soviets since the U.S.
 >military under General MacArthur was considering using their
 >nuclear weapons against Chinese troops during the Korean War.

>To quote from one of the e-mails I got from a fellow researcher
 >of the UFO phenomena, on December 5th, President Truman wrote in
 >his diary, "It looks like World War III is here. I hope not -
 >but we must meet whatever comes - and we will.". Secretary of
 >State Dean Acheson went to bed thinking that he would not be
 >surprised to be awoken by an announcement of a global war. The
 >following morning all hell seemed to break loose when the U.S.
 >early warning system picked up a formation of unidentified
 >objects flying in over Alaska on a southeast heading towards
 >Washington, D.C. All interception and defense forces were
 >alerted.

>As am sure you all know, WWII did not happen that day. The
 >official explanation given was it was a false alarm produced by
 >a flight of geese (this was in the pre-pelican days). Was it
 >something more serious than just birds? I think it was. That

up a flight of several dozen aircraft approaching our east coast. They are unidentified and do not respond to our signalling. They could be Russian bombers. If they proceed on the present course they will be over Washington D.C. in several hours, having passed over major cities along the East Coast. The Continental Air Command has scrambled and is on high alert. We have begun preparations for a National Emergency and handling of the press. I suggest you take any precautions you think necessary in the event that this is an attack. I'll keep you informed. After I hang up all civilian communications with the Pentagon will be cut off.. I will keep you informed as the situation develops. Goodbye."

Shock! Could this be the realization of his worst nightmare? By resisting the North Korean aggression had President Truman brought on the most-feared consequence, nuclear war with the Soviet Union? Were these Soviet bombers loaded with atomic bombs to drop on Boston, New York and Washington, D.C.?

"Impossible," he thought as he placed the phone in its cradle. "I don't believe it. The CIA has not reported any troop movements or aircraft activity that would suggest the Russians were preparing to attack."

Not true

And yet, the radar had detected something. It must have been something big to cause this much activity by the Continental Air Command.

Despite his apprehension he proceeded to the meeting with Mr. Clement Atlee as if nothing were happening.

But, in the back of his mind he knew that some objects were approaching the United States. What were they?

What you have just read is partly fiction and partly fact. Something DID happen that morning, something that has been glossed over in the history books as an "accident" of the radar. But was it? Read on. What follows is NOT fiction.

.....

PART 2: IMMEDIATE HIGH ALERT FOR FLYING SAUCERS

"URGENT. DECEMBER 8. RE: FLYING SAUCERS. This office very confidentially advised by Army Intelligence, Richmond, that they have been put on immediate high alert for any data whatsoever concerning flying saucers. CIC here states background of instructions not available from Air Force Intelligence, who are not aware of reason for alert locally, but any information whatsoever must be telephoned by them immediately to Air Force Intelligence. CIC advises data strictly confidential and should not be disseminated (sic)."

}
}

The above teletype message is contained in file 62-83894, the "flying disc" file of the FBI, the REAL X-Files! (The Truth is In Here!)

How very strange for the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) to be put on immediate high alert for any data regarding objects/phenomena/craft which the U. S. Air Force had publically and repeatedly claimed can all be explained and are no threat to the security of the United States! Are we to presume the CIC has

nothing better to do than to run around chasing "will o' the wisps" and similar ethereal things of no consequence to national defense? Of course not! We may imagine that Air Force Intelligence, headquartered in the Pentagon, requested the immediate high alert because something had happened, something related to flying saucers that demanded immediate attention. Evidently whatever had happened was so serious a matter that the CIC was not told the reason for the high alert. Not only that but the high alert condition was "confidential" and "not to be disseminated" which suggests that the CIC agent broke security by telling the FBI agent in Richmond.

\What had happened? Even today we don't know ... but based on other information we can make a guess.

.....

PART 3: THE COLONEL'S STORY

In 1977 Retired Air Force Col. Robert Willingham filed a report with NICAP regarding his observation of what he believed to be a Crashed Saucer. What? Did he say a Crashed Saucer? Yes, he did. And here is what happened, according to the affidavit he filed with the National Investigations Committee on Aerial Phenomena (NICAP) and now in the file of the Center for UFO Studies (CUFOS). (NICAP was a civilian UFO research group founded in the latter half of the 1950's. It was the largest such group in the 1960's but it closed in the late 1970's. CUFOS, founded in the early 1970's, still exists in Chicago.) The complete affidavit is presented in A History of UFO Crashes by Kevin Randle (Avon Books, NY, 1995). Supplemental information is in parentheses: "Down in Dyess Air Force Base in (Abilene) Texas, we were testing what turned out to be the F-94 (Lockheed Starfire, jet fighter, top speed about 600 mph, operational in 1950). They reported on the scope that they had an unidentified flying object at a high speed going to intercept our course. It became visible to us and we wanted to take off after it. Headquarters wouldn't let us go after it and we played around a little bit. We got to watching how it made 90 degree turns at this high speed and everything. We knew it wasn't a missile of any type. So then, we confirmed it with the radar control station on the DEW (Distant Early Warning) line (NORAD - North American Defense Command) and they kept following it and they claimed that it crashed somewhere off between Texas and the Mexico border. We got a light aircraft, me and my copilot, and we went down to the site. We landed out in the pasture right across from where it hit. We got over there. They told us to leave and everything else and then armed guards came out and they started to form a line around the area. So, on the way back, I saw a little piece of metal so I picked it up and brought it back with me. There were two sand mounds that came down and it looked to me like this thing crashed right between them. But it went into the ground, according to the way people were acting around it. So we never did get up to the site to see what had crashed. But you could see for, oh I'd say, three to five hundred yards where it went across the sand." "It looked to me, I guess from the metal that we found, that it either had a little explosion or it began to disintegrate. Something caused this metal to come apart." "It looked like something that was made because it was honeycombed. You know how you would make a metal that would cool faster. In a way it looked like magnesium steel but it had a lot of carbon in it. I tried to heat it with a cutting torch. It just wouldn't melt. A cutting torch burns anywhere from 3200 to 3800 degrees Fahrenheit and it would make the metal hot but it wouldn't even start the metal to yield." According to Willingham, some time

later he took the metal to the Marine Corps testing lab in Hagarstown, MD and gave it to some person for testing. When he returned for the results a few days later he was told there was no such person working there. Later was told never to talk about the incident he signed a secrecy oath (which he apparently broke in 1977). Todd Zechel, who was active in UFO research in the latter 1970's, investigated Willingham's story. In the middle 1980's Zechel told me some of the information he had learned from his investigation. According to Zechel this crash occurred between Dec. 5 and Dec. 8, 1950. (Randle lists the date as December 6.) It was Zechel's opinion based on Willingham's story and a document (discussed below) that the crash occurred on December 5, the recovery occurred on December 6, a general alert to counterintelligence was sent out on December 7, and the FBI learned about it on December 8. Zechel told this author that in 1978 he and a Japanese TV documentary team chartered a plane and flew, with Col. Willingham, to the location of the crash. It was roughly in the vicinity of Del Rio, Texas (Zechel did not tell me the exact location.). Del Rio is about 230 air miles from Abilene. According to Zechel, Willingham said that the UFO was at an altitude of about 50,000 ft (nearly the maximum altitude of the F-94) and traveling 3 to 4 times faster than the jet, i.e., several times the speed of sound. It did a right angle turn, then slowed and started wobbling. Then it dropped downward continuously and went out of the pilot's sight. Radar in Texas tracked the object until it went off the screen in a manner which suggested a crash. Willingham and the copilot returned to Dyess AFB, landed and got a small civil air patrol plane and flew to the border area where they thought it had crashed. (Depending upon the speed of the small aircraft and the exact location along the border, it could have taken two hours or more from the time the object appeared to crash until Willingham reached the site.) Willingham said that the Mexican military had reached the site before he got there. The Mexican military cordoned off the area and waited for US Air Force personnel to arrive Zechel further told me that in 1975 he was fortunate to obtain a declassified but formerly Top Secret document which stated that Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas, had recovered some foreign object on December 6 or 7. He said the document referred to a high alert status because of the nature of the recovery, but the document did not specify what had been recovered. (Zechel did not provide me with a copy of this document.) (For what it's worth, the controversial "Eisenhower Briefing Document" released in 1987 by Timothy Goode and, independently, by William Moore, also claims a crash near the Texas-Mexico border on December 6.) There is a discrepancy in Willingham's story which probably is a result of faulty memory. He said that the UFO was detected by "the radar control station on the DEW (Distant Early Warning) line (NORAD - North American Defense Command)" and that the DEW radar "kept following it and they claimed that it crashed somewhere off between Texas and the Mexico border." The DEW line was not established until late 1953 and it was located in Alaska and northern Canada, so it could not possibly have tracked an object over Texas. The closest Air Defense Command radar at the time was at Walker AFB at Roswell, NM. However, this was also too far away. On the other hand there were Air Force bases in Texas which probably had radar installations that could have tracked the object reported by Willingham. Dyess AFB at Abilene is more than 200 miles from the Del Rio area of Texas. This is beyond the range of typical radar installations of the time (see discussion below) and so a radar at Dyess would not have been able to determine that an object went below the radar horizon or crashed at the distance of Del Rio. However, a radar installation at Kelly AFB, Brooks AFB or Randolph AFB, all near

Zechel 1977

San Antonio, could have tracked an object to the vicinity of Del Rio without exceeding the range of the radar

PART 4: DISCONNECTED EVENTS? So far we have three seemingly disconnected events: a documentable (see below) "national emergency" by the Defense Department on December 6, 1950, a documentable immediate high alert for saucer related information on December 8 and witness testimony about a flying saucer crash near the Texas-Mexico border on or about December 6, 1950. Could these be related? The existence of the FBI teletype message raises (at least) two related questions: why an immediate high alert, and why on December 8? Neither of these questions can be definitely answered at the present time because the CIC and Air Force records relating to this simply have not been found, even after a search, at my request, of CIC records by the Army Security agency. However, I can speculate that if a saucer had crashed on December 6 and been retrieved on the 6th or 7th, the Air Force intelligence may well have issued requests for immediate information in order to find out if any sightings had been made or if any other saucers had crashed. The high alert condition could then have been communicated to the FBI in a confidential way a day or so later (i.e., Dec. 8). Whether the Air Force intelligence or the CIC received any special UFO information is not known. However, there were sightings on December 6 which are in the Blue Book file: one at West Springfield, Massachusetts (near Westover AFB) at 8:16 AM (one object, half-moon shaped, fast, flying in a southerly direction) and one at Fort Myers, Florida at 5 PM (a former aircraft purchasing agent and four boys, using 10-power binoculars, saw a 75' object, 3-4' thick with a bubble on top, silver colored with a red rim and having two white and two orange jets along the side; the center revolved when the object hovered and then it flew away very fast). The first object was "identified" as a aircraft by Project Blue Book; the second was unidentified. (The next sighting listed in the Blue Book file was in London, England, on December 9. Another of the only about 700 unidentified sightings in the Blue Book collection occurred on December 11 in Alaska.)

PART V: A RADAR EMERGENCY

So, what really happened on December 6 that nearly caused a national emergency?. The full story is not known, but the available information is intriguing. As you read the following discussion keep in mind that the global political situation was "hot". There were two wars and two races: a Cold War between the USA and the Soviet Union and a Hot War in Korea, a missile race and an atomic bomb race. Russia and China were becoming potent Communist adversaries of the capitalist democracies. Their states purpose was to overthrow the capitalism. They were investing major portions of their country's resources into armaments and armies. The war in Korea was viewed as the first real military contest between communism and capitalism, and it was not going well for the USA and South Korea. Ever since the beginning of the war in June, 1950, the U. S. government had been worried about the Chinese response to the attempt of the United Nations to preserve the independence of South Korea. These worries increased after General MacArthur landed at Inchon in September and succeeded in driving the North Korean army back across the 38th parallel (the agreed-upon northern boundary of South Korea). In October and November U. N. troops pushed into North Korea under MacArthur's orders to destroy the North Korean

army. Finally on November 25 the Chinese counterattacked with about 200,000 men, a number which doubled over the next month. U.N. forces, numbered at about one half the Chinese force, were once again in danger of complete defeat. This was causing a near panic situation in the USA. President Truman was worried about the possibility that the war would widen, even bringing on World War III, which could necessitate a nuclear response and "nuclear armageddon." The Joint Chiefs of Staff (the "top brass" of all the armed services) had sent a warning to U. S. forces commanders throughout the world of a heightened possibility for world war. It was against this background of war jitters that a large group of "unidentified aircraft" was suddenly detected approaching the USA from the north, from the general direction of the Soviet Union! Was this the feared attack? Some important people were afraid it was!

There are three published versions of what happened during the morning of December 6. The version presented here first comes from the autobiography of Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (W.W. Norton Pub., NY; pages 479-480). The second version, published in The Wise Men by Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas (Simon and Shuster, NY; 1986; pages 544-545) is based in an interview with Mr. Acheson. It differs slightly from Mr. Acheson's own version. The third is in Memoirs of Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1952 (Vol. 2, page 405). Looking first at Secretary Acheson's autobiography we find that on the morning of December 6, "soon after my arrival at the (State) Department, Deputy Secretary of Defense Lovett telephoned a report and an instruction from the President. Our early warning radar system in Canada had picked up formations of unidentified objects, presumably aircraft, headed southeast on a course that could bring them over Washington in two or three hours. All interception and defense forces were alerted. I was to inform but not advise the Prime Minister (Clement Atlee of Britain). The Pentagon telephones would be closed for all but emergency defense purposes and he could not talk again. Before he hung up, I asked whether he believed that the objects that were picked up were Russian bombers. He said that he did not. Getting Oliver Franks (the British ambassador) on the telephone I repeated the message. He asked whether the President had canceled the eleven-thirty meeting with Attlee, and was told that he had not. We agreed to meet there. Before ending the talk, he wondered about the purpose of my message. I suggested fair warning and an opportunity for prayer. As we finished, one of our senior officials burst into the room. How he had picked up the rumor I do not know, perhaps from the Pentagon. He wanted to telephone his wife to get out of town, and to have important files moved to the basement. I refused to permit him to do either and gave him the choice of a word-of-honor commitment not to mention the matter to anyone or being put under security detention. He wisely cooled off and chose the former. When we reached the White House, Lovett told us that the unidentified objects had disappeared. His guess was that they had been geese."

There are several important points to keep in mind as you read the following versions of what happened. Acheson said that "early warning radar in Canada" had detected "formations" (plural) of "unidentified objects, presumably aircraft" which were headed "southeast" in a direction that could put them over Washington, DC in 2 to 3 hours. Using an estimated top speed of 300 mph for Soviet bombers, this would put them a mere 600 - 900 miles from Washington. Acheson's story indicates that President Truman already knew about the unidentified aircraft and wanted Acheson to inform the British ambassador. Acheson ended his

story by saying that, after he arrived at the White House, that is, at about 11:30 AM, Defense Undersecretary Lovett told him he "guessed" that the objects were geese.

The next version of the story, told in *The Wise Men*, is based on an interview with Mr. Acheson:

"For a moment on the morning of December 6, he thought his nightmare (of world war) had come true. At 10:30 AM Bob Lovett called him from the Pentagon and abruptly informed him in his laconic voice: 'When I finish talking to you, you cannot reach me again. All incoming calls will be stopped. A national emergency is about to be proclaimed. We are informed that there is flying over Alaska at the present moment a formation of Russian planes heading southeast. The President wishes the British ambassador to be informed of this and be told that Mr. Attlee should take whatever measures are proper for Mr. Attlee's safety. I've now finished my message and I'm going to ring off.' Acheson cut in, 'Now wait a minute, Bob, do you believe this?' 'No,' Lovett replied, and hung up. Acheson sat in his office and waited. The Air Force scrambled. A senior official burst in asking permission to telephone his wife to get out of town and wondering if he should begin moving files to the basement. Acheson tried to sooth him. A few minutes later Lovett calmly called back. The radar blips were not Soviet bombers after all. They were flocks of geese."

This version makes it seem that the alert period was very short, only a few minutes. However, by combining the information in this version about the beginning time, 10:30 AM, with the information in Acheson's biography about the ending time (after Acheson arrived at the White House), about 11:30 AM, we find that the alert lasted about an hour. This version is more specific as to where the objects were: they were detected over Alaska, which is over 3,000 miles from Washington, D. C. If that were true it would have taken not just two to three hours but much more than 10 hours for the planes to arrive over Washington.

President Truman wrote about the same episode:

"Shortly before we went into that morning meeting, Under Secretary Lovett called from the Pentagon, reporting that the radar screens of some air defense installations in the far north were reporting large formations of unidentified planes approaching. Fighter planes were sent up to reconnoiter and alerts were flashed to air centers in New England and beyond. But about an hour later -- while I was meeting with (Clement) Attlee -- Lovett notified me that the report had been in error. Some unusual disturbance in the Arctic atmosphere had thrown the radar off."

President Truman's version of the event suggests that the objects may have been detected north of the eastern United States rather than over Alaska. The fact that fighter aircraft were scrambled indicates that this alert was treated as a serious event by the Continental Air Command. Truman's explanation is somewhat different from Acheson's. Here we learn that the radar detections were caused by some sort of atmospheric disturbance.

An unpublished version of this event is found in the official transcript of the meeting between Truman and Attlee which is preserved at the Truman library:

"At this point (in the meeting) Mr. Connelly entered the room and handed the President a report from Deputy Secretary of Defense Lovett. Mr. Lovett was reporting that the 'alert' that had reached the President an hour earlier when it was thought that a large number of unidentified airplanes were approaching the northeast coast of the United States, had now been due to erroneous interpretation of atmospheric conditions. The President informed the Prime Minister that the report of the planes was in error. The Prime Minister expressed relief and gratification."

This version, based on notes made at the time rather than upon memories years afterward, says the unidentified objects were approaching the northeast coast of the United States, clearly contradicting Acheson's assertion that they were detected over Alaska, unless, of course, there were two groups of objects. Furthermore, this version indicates Lovett was the source of the "atmospheric effects" explanation mentioned by President Truman. But Lovett was also the source of the "geese" explanation reported by Acheson. So, which explanation was right? Or was neither correct?

A report carried by the International News Service reported yet another explanation:

"Washington D.C., 6 December 1950 (INS): A warning of an impending air attack resulted in a false alarm in this capitol city today. No air raid alarms were sounded, but functionaries charged with the Civil Air Defense of Washington were alerted that an unidentified aircraft had been detected off the coast of the State of Maine at mid-day. Later, a spokesman for the Air Force stated that interceptor aircraft had been dispatched, and that the object in question had been identified shortly thereafter as a North American C-47 aircraft which was approaching the continent from Goose Bay, Labrador. The warning was said to have been useful in verifying the efficiency of the Washington Civil Defense System. Civil Defense officials declined to comment on the incident."

This report, supposedly based on an Air Force statement, says the radar target was from a single C-47 (capable of up to 220 mph at altitudes up to 24,000 ft) approaching from Goose Bay, Labrador, a location about 500 miles north-northeast of the northeastern "top" of Maine. It says nothing about unknown aircraft over Alaska. Detection of planes near or over northeastern Maine (coming from the direction of Goose Bay) would be more compatible with the claim in Acheson's autobiography that the planes were several hours from reaching Washington, DC (the northeastern corner of Maine is about 700 miles from Washington, D.C., 2 1/3 hours at 300 mph).

It appears that this supposed attack did have repercussions in Alaska. The New York Times published a story with a December 7, Anchorage Alaska, dateline which said that "All military personnel in Alaska were called on 'alert' tonight (i.e., Dec. 6), but Air Force officials said that the order was purely a 'precautionary measure.' Military police rounded up soldiers and theatres and radio stations made special announcements that troops were to return to their posts. Within a few hours there were no military personnel to be seen on Anchorage streets. Officials at Elmendorf Air Force Base said the alert had been in effect since the outbreak of the fighting in Korea. But they added that the air force had increased its vigilance here in recent days."

Further evidence of the official "jitters" is in the statement in the Washington Post on December 10 that "President Truman is 'seriously considering declaration of national emergency' which could lead to an "immediate all-out mobilization."

Over Alaska? Over Labrador? Flocks of Geese? Arctic atmospheric effects? A single C-47 aircraft? Or something else? Not until 1987 was further information on this event released by the Air Force, and sparse information at that! What follows was found by Don Berliner by accident during a search of declassified files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Record group 330, July 1, 1950 to December, 1951 (at the National Archives).

On December 6, Air Force Colonel Charles Winkle, Assistant Executive in the Directorate for Plans, wrote a memorandum for Secretary of Defense George Marshall about this event. It confirms the alert:

SUBJECT: Air Alert - 1030 Hours , 6 December 1950

1. The ConAC (Continental Air Command) Air Defense Controller notified the Headquarters USAF Command Post that at 1030 hours a number of unidentified aircraft were approaching the northeast area of the United States and that there was no reason to believe the aircraft were friendly.

2. This information was further amplified at 1040 hours as follows. By radar contact it was determined that approximately 40 aircraft were in flight, at 32,000 feet, on a course of 200 degrees in the vicinity of Limestone, Maine.

3. The emergency alert procedure went into effect immediately.

4. The Office of the President was notified. Brigadier General Landry returned the call and stated that the President had been notified and that:

a. All information in this matter was to be released by the Department of the Air Force.

b. Office of the President would release no information.

c. The substance of a and b above was to be passed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

5. At 1104 hours the ConAC Air Defense Controller state that the original track had faded out and it appeared that the flight as originally identified is a friendly flight.

6. ConAC took immediate action to dispatch interceptors on the initial contact.

.....

PART VI: RADAR ANALYSIS

The technical information in this document is sparse, but there are details which, when combined with the known capabilities of radar, call into question all of the previous explanations. In order to understand why, one must learn about the capabilities and locations of early warning radar installations in Maine.

By the beginning of WWII radar technology had developed to the point that aircraft detections at 150 miles were common. After

the Japanese attack in December, 1941, the Army deployed, along the east and west coasts of the US, radar sets capable of detecting aircraft at 150 mile range at 20,000 ft elevation. By the late 1940's there were radar sets capable of a 200 mile range at 40,000 ft. The question now becomes, what were the capabilities and locations of the long-range search radar installations in Maine?

A valuable reference in this regard is "Searching the Skies; The Legacy of the United States Cold War Defense Radar Program" published by the USAF Air Combat Command (David Winkler, June, 1997) which recounts the history of the early warning radar that was set up by the Air Defense Command. These radar installations were dedicated to the detection of incursions into US airspace from the north. Generally they were located at sites where there already were radar installations used for other purposes such as air traffic control of military and civilian aircraft. Of course, there were also search radar installations at civilian airports and Air Force bases. One of these probably was at Loring AFB at Limestone, Maine, or at Presque Isle AFB at Presque Isle, Maine.

According to "Searching the Skies," in December, 1950 there was an AN/CPS-5 and also an AN/TPS-10A radar at Dow AFB near Bangor, Maine. These are Army/Navy (AN) search radars. The CPS-5 was a search radar and the TPS-10A was a "height finder." The combination of these radars gave a "solid search of up to 60 miles at 40,000 ft" but often "had success tracking aircraft as far as 210 miles away."

By combining the known radar capabilities with the information in Winkle's document one can make a crude estimate of the speed of the objects. If we assume that the initial detection (10:30 AM) was made by the radar at Bangor, at the limit of its detection range, then at that time the objects were about 200 miles north-northeast of Bangor. About 10 minutes later (10:40 AM) the objects were "in the vicinity of" (over?) Limestone, Maine, which is about 150 miles north-northeast of Bangor. Hence these objects would have traveled about 50 miles in 10 minutes corresponding to a speed of 300 mph, the upper limit for long range bomber aircraft in 1950, but easily attained by fighter aircraft.

This speed calculation is based on the assumption that the initial detection was not made by radar installations that were closer to the northern border of Maine. The only reason for making this assumption is that the existence of a long range radar at Dow AFB is documented. I have no documentation on long range radar installations that may have been at Loring AFB, or at the nearby Presque Isle AFB, both of which are near the northeastern border of Maine. The capabilities of these assumed radars are unknown. However, according to "Searching the Skies," there was an AN/TPS-1B long range search radar that came "on line" at Loring AFB for use by the Air Defense Command or by ConAC in February, 1951. It is quite likely that this radar or one like it was already operating as an air traffic control radar at the Air Force Base in December, 1950. This type of radar had a capability of detecting aircraft at altitudes up to 10,000 ft at a range of 120 miles. At closer ranges it could detect aircraft at higher altitudes.

If we assume that a radar such as this made the initial detection then the estimated speed will be considerably larger than the 300 mph calculated above. Assume that at the initial detection was made about 100 miles from Loring AFB at Limestone.

Then, ten minutes later the objects were "in the vicinity of Limestone, Maine." That would mean they had traveled nearly 100 miles in 10 minutes for a speed of 500 - 600 mph, far in excess of anything but the fastest fighter jets of the time. Similarly, if the detection had been made from Loring AFB by a radar with a range of 200 miles, then the initial detection could have occurred when the objects were about 200 miles from Limestone. To travel 200 miles in 10 minutes requires a speed of 1,200 mph.

SNAFU OR SAUCERS?

(SNAFU: situation normal: all fouled up)

As the preceding discussion shows, there is not enough information about the radar detections to allow an exact calculation of the speed of the objects. However, it appears that they were traveling at least 300 mph and quite likely twice that and perhaps over 1,000 mph.

The radar operators tracked the objects for ten minutes and determined that there were 40 objects ("aircraft") flying at a rather high altitude (32,000 ft) and traveling south-southwestward (a course of 200 degrees). This course would take them over the eastern USA, roughly toward Washington, D.C.

The fact that the air force bases scrambled aircraft to intercept and identify the intruders" means the radar images were so good that the operators were certain that these objects were real, unidentifiable yet solid targets, presumably aircraft, and not accidents of the radar. This is decidedly different from what the operators would have concluded had the radar showed relatively slow moving geese or "atmospheric effects" such as a radar mirage due to temperature inversion. Geese and atmospheric effects don't travel at hundreds of miles per hour along continuous tracks for many minutes.

The statement that there was "no reason to believe the aircraft were friendly" means that the Continental Air Command radar operators were not able to identify the aircraft from a known flight plan, nor were they able to communicate with the aircraft by radio. Had the aircraft been a single C-47 they certainly could have identified it as friendly since it would have responded to the numerous requests to identify itself. Furthermore, it would not have been as high as 32,000 ft, flying as fast as 300 mph and there likely would have been a flight plan. The intruders, on the other hand, were flying high, fast and were radio-silent.

According to Winkle's document the radar track "faded out" at 11:04 AM, or about 24 minutes after the objects were near Limestone. If the objects had continued on the 200 degree course at a speed of 300 mph they would have traveled about 100 miles from Limestone and would have been nearing the limit of a 120 mile radar range. If they had been traveling at 600 mph, they would have been beyond the range of the of Limestone radar which would explain the fading of the track. (One would expect, however, that they would have been tracked by the Dow AFB radar as they continued southward.)

The strangest statement in the document is: "it appears that the flight as originally identified is a friendly flight." What does that mean, "it appears?" Didn't they know for certain? Didn't they track the "friendly aircraft" until they were positive? Are we to believe that the Continental Air Command scrambled aircraft and put the USA into a state of immediate high alert and then weren't able to positively identify the aircraft?

One would expect if there had been upwards of forty friendly aircraft coming from the north toward the USA border someone would have been aware of it. There would have been a flight plan. At the very least these aircraft would have acknowledged the attempts to contact them by radio, attempts which must have been made numerous times starting with the first detection by radar. Either the flight plan or the radio identification would have been passed to the local commanders of the Continental Air Command aircraft to prevent needless scrambling of aircraft.

If these intruders were group of friendly aircraft why did Undersecretary of Defense Robert Lovett tell Dean Acheson that flocks of geese flying over Alaska caused the radar targets? Why did Undersecretary Lovett tell the President that arctic atmospheric conditions caused the radar targets? Why did the Air Force tell the press that a single C-47 caused the alert?

Presumably these were the explanations offered by the Top Brass after being told the details by the people who were directly involved with the radar detections and the scramble. Were the Top Brass embarrassed by the initial misidentification of a "friendly flight" and afraid to admit it? (I doubt that. They "admitted" to the press that it was a single C-47.) Or did the Top Brass, for whatever reason, not tell the President and the Undersecretary of Defense what these targets really were? Or were these people told but, when writing about it years later, they could not recall or could not reveal the exact nature of these objects to anyone else?

There must be other Air Force documents not yet released which clarify this situation. However, based on the information available in this document combined with the fact that CIC was put on immediate high alert for flying saucer information only two days later, I can suggest another explanation: perhaps the radar targets were flying saucers!

Perhaps one of them caused the 5 PM sighting in Ft. Myers, Florida.

And perhaps one of them flew somewhat erratically over Texas and crashed in Mexico.

Perhaps. Will we ever know?

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank Don Berliner, Stanton Friedman, Kevin Randle, Todd Zechel, the FBI, Charles Winkle, Dean Acheson, Harry Truman and "approximately forty" high-flying "aircraft" for making this mystery possible.

[[Next Message](#) | [Previous Message](#) | [This Day's Messages](#)]
[[This Month's Index](#) | [UFO UpDates Main Index](#) | [MUFON Ontario](#)]

*Disc 10/15/99
Civilt*

Our first week's offering takes the form of three letters...

Subject: Reiterated Request for Coordination (July 15, 1999)

TO: Attorney General, Embassy of Mexico, Washington, D.C.

Since my below-quoted e-mail message to Ambassador Reyes-Heroles has gone unanswered, I ask that you intercede in this matter for me to determine whether your official embassy website's manager ever forwarded the message to the ambassador. I also ask that you inform the ambassador of the following (formerly classified) excerpt from a 1950 official U.S. military document that surfaced in a recent examination of UFO-related records maintained by the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, to wit:

"It has recently been rumored that one of these so-called flying saucers crashed in Mexico; however, the details are somewhat bizarre at this moment." (written to an M.I.T. scientist by U.S. Air Force Lt. Colonel Robert H. Blount, chief of the Medical Research Division, Office of the Surgeon General, Headquarters, USAF, the Pentagon).

Please contact me soon to let me know exactly which Mexican government official would be the most appropriate person to whom I may mail a photo-copy of this key record in the history of the UFO-coverup controversy.

Meantime, a contemporary rumor has been circulating in recent days about an impending French government announcement as regards that country's official appraisal of the UFO problem -- expected to be made in a few days. This event might inspire you and the ambassador to do the right thing toward setting the MEXICAN record straight in the eyes of the public. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

HERE's the text of my original message (subject: Request for Coordination):

DATE: May 14, 1999

FROM: 3518 Martha Custis Drive Alexandria, VA 22302

TO: The Honorable Jesus F. Reyes-Heroles Ambassador of Mexico to the United States Embassy of Mexico Washington, DC

Dear Sir:

Word has come to me of the surfacing of an official U.S. document referring to the rumored retrieval by U.S. military authorities of a "flying saucer" from its crash-landing site in December 1950 on Mexican soil, across the border from Del Rio, Texas.

As I await receipt of the planned press release on this development, it occurs to me that the Mexican government may wish to embark upon an effort to reclaim this part of international history stolen from Mexico by the opportunistic and deceptive U.S. soldiers who chose to confiscate the apparently extraterrestrial spacecraft without proper authority from your central government.

Accordingly, I suggest that you immediately contact the U.S. State Department with the request that it proceed with the prompt return of the craft to Mexican custody, accompanied by an official U.S. apology for the improper confiscation. Should the U.S. State Department deny your request, I recommend that you file a formal complaint with the United Nations World Court in The Hague. Concurrently, you may wish to convene a "truth commission" in Mexico (patterned after the truth-commission process being pursued in South Africa) to investigate and report upon the facts, events, and principals associated with this international incident of official deception and coverup now nearing its 50th anniversary. The "Del Rio Case Truth Commission's" subpoena power could help ferret out UFO-coverup whistleblowers and produce further documentary evidence from both sides of the border in this unfolding saga of what occurred, and why, on Mexican soil so long ago.

This renewed opportunity for investigation and public disclosure comes at a time most apropos in the history of UFO research, both in the United States and in Mexico. For, right now, U.S. citizens in at least 16 states are contemplating the gathering of signatures for placing on their respective ballots a proclamation calling for a full-scale congressional inquiry into the UFO coverup. Likewise, Mexican citizens' awareness of UFO reality has intensified during the past few years of increased UFO

activity in your country.

I realize, of course, that you might wish to predicate your response to this revelation upon your receipt of the document in question. As soon as I receive a copy of it, I shall forward it to whomever you designate as the appropriate recipient in your embassy. Could you please have that person call me soon at 703-931-3341 to coordinate this transmittal?

Thank you for helping reopen, reexamine, and resolve this historic case of international (and interglobal) intrigue.

Yours truly,

Larry W. Bryant Director of Governmental Affairs Mutual UFO Network, Inc.

Here's the text of a letter I sent to the Embassy of France on July 16, 1999:

TO: Chief of Information Embassy of France ATTN: Council of Scientific Affairs 4101 Reservoir Road Washington, DC 20007

Dear Sir:

Pursuant to a telephone conversation today between me and your employee "J.P.," I'm enclosing some correspondence about the topics of that conversation, particularly about my recent communication addressed to the Embassy of Mexico.

In light of recent e-mail traffic about a forthcoming quasi-official appraisal of France's official UFO-research project (GEPAN) (see enclosed printout), your office might wish to initiate discussion with your counterpart at the Mexican Embassy to help coordinate future action on the socio-political implications of these developments. By so doing, you will have taken the lead in marching 20th century science (and global politics) into the next millennium.

In this regard, I urge you to invite Mr. Steven Bassett, holder of a degree in physics and a registered lobbyist, to brief your staff (and any kindred personnel from the Mexican and Canadian

Embassies) as to what role you and others can play in letting the French-Mexican UFO connection speak to the widest possible international audience. Mr. Bassett's mailing address is: Paradigm Research Group, 4938 Hampden Lane - Suite 161, Bethesda, MD 20814; his phone number is 301-564-1820; and, via his website of <http://www.paradigmRG.com>, his e-mail address is: paradigmRG@aol.com.

Thank you for helping advance any opportunity to capitalize upon this potential breakthrough in both the science and the politics of serious, international UFO research.

LARRY W. BRYANT Director of Governmental Affairs Mutual UFO Network, Inc.

Copies furnished to:

* Mr. Walter H. Andrus, MUFON International Director (Seguin, Texas -- <http://www.mufon.com> * Steven Bassett * Peter Robbins, editor of the website <http://www.UFOcity.com> (New York City)

DATE: July 19, 1999

TO: Commander Wright-Patterson Air Force Base ATTN: Freedom of Information Manager Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH 45433

Based on the enclosed copy of Page 22 from the Summer 1999 issue of "Ohio UFO Notebook" (titled "Roswell Debris at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base - Evidence by Remote Viewing"), I hereby submit this letter as a freedom-of-information request.

Please send me a copy of all U.S.-government-received and U.S.-government-generated records pertaining to the WPAFB-based National Air Intelligence Center's reaction to, and processing of, the "remote-viewing report" provided to the Center by officials of the Mid-Ohio Research Associates, Inc., of Dublin, Ohio.

Since I make this request on behalf of a number of UFO-related

UFO-research organizations, I ask that you waive all records-search fees associated with you fulfilling it.

LARRY W. BRYANT Director of Governmental Affairs Mutual UFO Network, Inc.

Copies furnished to:

Mark S. Zaid, Esq. (Washington, D.C.) Director, Mutual UFO Network, Inc. (Seguin, Texas) Director, Citizens Against UFO Secrecy (Scottsdale, Arizona) Director, Operation Right to Know (Gaithersburg, Maryland) Editor, Internet website of <http://www.ufocity.com> Editor, ABC News TV show "Nightline"
Lewis Kannon

AUTHOR'S FOOTNOTE:

Starting with this standard FOIA request from the citizens' arsenal for compelling greater freedom of official UFO information, I seek to mount a new legal action against the keepers of the Ultimate Secret. Upon receiving the requested records, I shall include them as evidentiary background information to complement a "John Doe" affidavit to be sought from the remote viewer in question.

Other affidavits (like the late Lt. Col. Corso's) and supporting depositions from remote-viewing experts (some of whom may be former government-paid practitioners of the craft) will round out my planned filing, in federal district court, of a "petition for writ of mandamus." The petition would have the court direct the U.S. Department of Justice to investigate, and to report upon, the current whereabouts of the "Roswell Incident" crashed-saucer debris and its related analytical documentation.

How can visitors to UFOcity.com support this effort? You can start by funneling to me all relevant "leaked" information, investigatory tips, pro bono legal counsel, and leads to prospective new UFO-coverup whistleblowers. The more you can contribute right now, the more likelihood that this effort will help raise public UFO awareness and help persuade official UFO policymakers that the status quo has to go.

Here's most of the text from the Page 22 article, as authored by MORA director William E. Jones:

"This story is an intriguing one, and we believe it should take its place within the larger context of the Roswell flying saucer crash account. We know this information was provided to the National Air Intelligence Center at WPAFB as part of their search for Roswell-related information in response to the U.S. General Accounting Office investigation. We know, because we provided it to them. We were later told that the story was looked into and nothing was found.

"The information was provided to us from a confidential source within the remote-viewing community but outside of MORA and MUFON. In our estimation, the source is objective. The source does not 'believe' in the value of remote viewing but has worked very hard using scientific principles to establish that possibility. To protect our source, that is all we will say, but it is not PsiTech or Ed Dames.

"Now, for the record, here is the remote-viewing report:

"Problem Description: Locate the whereabouts of the Roswell wreckage.

"Question, Current Time: Where is the majority of the Roswell crash wreckage now [1994]? Where is it being studied now?

"ANSWER: Large pieces of triangular and strutlike pieces of debris, wrapped in green cloth (surgical drapes) and overwrapped in tarpaulin, are sitting on dusty shelves in a warehouse at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. They are very high up on, to the very end of row 5. This row is the farthest right as you enter the front entrance of the warehouse. The warehouse door is open to the light and, currently, not closely guarded.

"People come and go through the open door. There is an office space to the left of the front door, and all the itinerary [does he mean INVENTORY here? -- L.W.B.] of the warehouse is coded in a locked file in a two-story stone building on the base. Documents there are dated 1958 and are yellowed with age around the edges. They relate to physical examination of the debris. The documents have a decal on the top left, of a circle with a horizontal line through, and writing is superimposed on the design. The debris is not currently being studied, but there is renewed interest from Los Alamos. I did not see any round debris (flying-saucer shape).'



"A map showing the location of the warehouse in relation to other buildings was also provided, and is reproduced here. If this map or the description of the warehouse sounds familiar, please get in touch with us."

NOTE: The MORA mailing address is Box 162, 5837 Karric Drive Square, Dublin, OH 43016.

For more information on Larry W. Bryant's ufological views, visit the website of the Computer UFO Network:
<http://www.cufon.org/cufon/CIR/bryant.htm>

we had no desire to act in this matter except as members of the United Nations.

Then I read to the Prime Minister the following memorandum that had been agreed on by the State and Defense Departments and to which I had given my approval.

"1. It would be militarily advantageous in the immediate situation if a cease-fire order could be arranged provided that considerations offered were not so great as to be unacceptable. This might insure full support of the United Nations. Arrangements for a cease-fire must not impose conditions which would jeopardize the safety of United Nations forces nor be conditioned on agreement on other issues, such as Formosa, and the Chinese seat in the United Nations.

"2. If a cease-fire should be effected which permits a stabilization of the situation, United Nations should proceed with the political, military and economic stabilization of the Republic of Korea while continuing efforts to seek an independent and unified Korea by political means.

"3. If the Chinese Communists reject a cease-fire and move major forces south of the 38th parallel, the United Nations forces may face a forced evacuation of Korea. The consequences of a voluntary abandonment of our Korean allies would be such that any United Nations evacuation must be clearly the result of military necessity only."

At this point I paused in the reading of the memorandum and emphatically repeated that it was out of the question that we should get out voluntarily. All the Koreans left behind who had been loyal to the United Nations would face death. The Communists cared nothing about human life. With this made clear, I continued with the memorandum:

"4. If the situation in the preceding paragraph develops, the United Nations must take immediate action to declare Communist China an aggressor and must mobilize such political and economic measures as are available to bring pressure upon Peiping and to affirm the determination of the United Nations not to accept an aggression. Also, there is the possibility of some military action which would harass the Chinese Communists and of efforts which could be made to stimulate anti-communist resistance within China itself, including the exploitation of Nationalist capabilities.

"In addition to the measures indicated above, the United States and United Kingdom should consult immediately about other steps which might be taken to strengthen non-communist Asia. These steps might include:

"(a) Restoration of considerable self-government to Japan, the ac-

celeration of efforts to obtain a Japanese peace settlement, the strengthening of Japanese capacity for self-defense, the greater utilization of productive capacity to strengthen the capabilities of the free world, and the prompt admission of Japan into international organizations. United Kingdom reluctance to move on these three points should be discarded in light of the new critical situation.

"(b) Appropriate military arrangements between nations in southeast Asia capable of effective mutual support.

"(c) Special efforts to convince non-communist Asia of the nature of the threat which confronts it and to urge upon the governments concerned the need for concerted Asian action to resist communist aggression in that area.

"(d) Intensification of economic and military assistance to encourage the organization of resistance to communist encroachment.

"(e) Intensification of psychological and cover activity against communist regimes and activity in Asia."

Commenting on the last two items, I said that I had been thinking about some kind of Marshall Plan for Southeast Asia. ECA had done a lot of good work there. A special plan was under way for the Philippines to stabilize their situation, and I expressed my hope that it would receive speedy approval in Congress. Plans of this kind, I said, deserved consideration and discussion.

Sir Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador in Washington, then skillfully summarized the discussion we had had and, after agreeing to a brief statement for the reporters, the meeting was adjourned.

Our next session was aboard the presidential yacht *Williamsburg* the following day, December 5, 1950. After a luncheon at which some congressional leaders were present, the same group that had conferred the previous afternoon met again. Charlie Ross, my long-time friend and press secretary, was also present. It was to be almost his last official function. That evening, while he was still at his desk, Charlie suffered a heart attack and died. We had been friends since high school days, and his loss grieved me very much. It struck me like a loss in my immediate family.

The earlier part of our December 5 meeting aboard the *Williamsburg* was taken up largely with a discussion of the text of the resolution to be introduced in the General Assembly of the United Nations. When the minor differences on this matter had been ironed out, however, I spoke about my deep concern and extreme preoccupation with the military situation in Korea.

I said again that I was determined that we would not back out—that if we got out, someone would have to force us out. We certainly could

Memories of Harry S. Truman

"Years of Trial & Hope"

Doubleday Co. One Garden City NY

1956

do no less for the South Koreans who had been loyal to us. I said that I realized that we were exposing our fleet and air arm to the danger of a surprise attack from Manchuria. "We did not get into this fight," I said, "with the idea of getting licked. We will fight to the finish to stop this aggression. **I don't intend to take over military command of the situation in Korea—I leave that up to the generals—**but I want to make it perfectly plain that we cannot desert our friends when the going gets rough."

I got a little warm as I talked, but Clement Attlee was no less sincere when he answered: "We are in it with you. We'll support you. We'll stand together on those bridgeheads. How long we can hold on is a matter of opinion."

I said again that, whatever we did, it could never be a voluntary withdrawal from Korea. "I don't want to get out," I insisted, "if there is any chance that we can stay."

"You can take it from me," Attlee repeated, "that we stand with you. Our whole purpose is to stand with you."

I thanked him for his attitude and for his words. Loyalty to principles and friends and also to treaty commitments is a British attitude, and it is ours too.

Attlee then returned to the discussion that we had had the day before, stating first what he thought we had agreed on. It seemed to him that there was agreement not to get bogged down in a major war with China and that we had ruled out bombing industrial centers in China. Then he restated the proposal Acheson had made; namely, that we should remain in Korea until forced out and not get into any negotiations. The Prime Minister's reaction to this was that, in the first place, it would be difficult to get U.N. action on any move that might appear directed against Peiping or likely to result in retaliations. He did not think, in the second place, that we would be able to hurt China much, while the Chinese might do us a good deal of harm. It seemed to him, he said, that we would wind up either in a shooting war or in negotiations.

Attlee then proceeded to give us the point of view of his government. In his opinion the Chinese Communists were potentially ripe for "Titoism." He could not consider that China was completely in the hands of Russia, and therefore the aim ought to be to divide the Russians and the Chinese—who are natural rivals in the Far East.

"I think," he said, "that all of us should try to keep the Chinese from thinking that Russia is their only friend. I want the Chinese to part company with Russia. I want them to become a counterpoise to Russia in the Far East. If we don't accept this theory, if we just treat the Chinese as Soviet satellites, we are playing the Russian game."

Secretary Acheson answered the Prime Minister with a rhetorical

question. What, he asked, did the American people think of as a long-range view? He said he did not see how it was possible for any administration to offer to the American people a foreign policy which, on one ocean, had a policy of isolationism, while at the same time it was advocating a very vigorous foreign policy, the opposite of isolationism, over the other ocean. We could not possibly be isolationists in the Pacific, ignoring there what the Communists in China had been doing, while at the same time we were taking a strong anti-isolationist stand against the threats of the Communists in Europe.

Acheson then made another telling point: Our country had gone on to do something quite vigorous in the case of a minor aggression in Korea. Now we were faced with a bigger aggression, the aggression of Communist China—we had even suffered a setback at the hands of this aggressor. If we accepted this larger aggression, it could not fail to affect our entire thinking about aggression—and not only in Asia but also in Europe. It would be a very confusing thing to try to get the American people to accept aggression in the Far East and not accept it in Europe.

The Secretary of State also called the attention of our British guests to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek was another complicating factor, for Chiang, rightly or wrongly, had become something of a symbol.

I gave Attlee a short summary of the kind of trouble that Chiang presented for us. I pointed out that his friends, especially in the Senate, kept up a running clamor on his behalf. Yet all of Chiang's actions suggested that he was not interested in improving the conditions of the territory he controlled but rather that he hoped to get us involved on China's mainland. And to this Acheson added that, entirely apart from Chiang Kai-shek, Formosa could not be allowed to fall into Communist hands. If, while we were so heavily engaged in Korea, he said, we permitted Formosa to be attacked and fall, we would raise the gravest dangers in Japan and the Philippines, which were the bases from which our operations were being conducted and upon which our whole Pacific position rested.

We could not buy the friendship of the Chinese Communists, Acheson insisted, and we ought not try to prove that we were more friendly to them than the Russians. After what they had done to us, it seemed to him that the Chinese would have to prove that they were *our* friends. Our position now, Acheson went on, was that we ought to get the military power and the strength to stop this sort of thing from happening in the future. We had to have a policy that would keep going on the basis of strength.

I expressed my full agreement with the presentation the Secretary

had made and added that it was important to realize that the United States could do nothing abroad without solid backing at home. We could not back out of the Far East. The American people would not stand for it. It was impossible.

Attlee said he understood that our foreign policy was dependent upon keeping the American people together. But it was also essential, he added, to keep the United Nations together. Furthermore, we had to keep Asian opinion together—nothing would be more dangerous than for the Asians to split away from us. Acheson broke in. "Weakening the United States," he said, "would be definitely more dangerous."

Attlee continued to argue the case for a policy that would consider the adherence of the Asian nations to the West as the primary aim. He turned to me, saying that he knew that I would have to consider public opinion about Chiang Kai-shek and Formosa but that he hoped I would also remember that whatever we did would have to be done through the U.N., and it could not be done there by the efforts and votes of just the United States and the United Kingdom, "important as we are."

Sir Oliver Franks proved himself again a fine diplomat as he stepped in and summarized the points that we appeared agreed upon. This brought the discussion back to specific points and first to the question of whether the seating of the Chinese Communists at the U.N. should be considered as a subject that might be included in negotiations with them.

Acheson took the position that we should not even consider it. If we did, we would in effect be saying to the Communists that they had won the game and could now collect the stakes; it would be like offering a reward for aggression. For that reason, if for no other, Acheson preferred that there be no negotiations at all, even if the Communists won and forced us out of Korea.

I asked General Marshall to speak to the same point, and the General said that he had very strong feelings in the matter from a military point of view. Supported by General Bradley, he stated the reasons why we could not afford to have our chain of island outposts split by a Formosa in hostile possession.

The British then advanced the idea that perhaps Chiang could be left in control on Formosa while at the same time we might recognize that China (proper) was under the Peiping regime. General Marshall made the comment that the biggest problem connected with Chiang was the fact that there was no replacement for him—that it had long been "brutally evident" that, despite the strong opposition to Chiang, there was nobody who could succeed him.

The meeting adjourned at 4:50 P.M.
Two meetings were held on December 6, the morning meeting being given over almost entirely to economic matters. The British had come to Washington with a list of the raw materials they needed in order to get their defense program stepped up properly. Their problem was simply that they could not import without exporting but that they had to import to rearm. The postwar "austerity" had forced the British economy to cut back to bare essentials, especially those required for the physical rebuilding of the country, and, as Attlee put it that morning, "we can't cut back much more; we don't have any fat left to sweat off."

There were some commodities which the British needed at once, such as zinc, sulphur, and cotton. Attlee asked that we consider these needs but that we also discuss with them the feasibility of setting up combined machinery to handle such economic problems, similar to the setup we had had during World War II.

I assured the Prime Minister that my associates and I appreciated the nature of the problem, which we had discussed at a Cabinet meeting the day before. I told him also that the staff and the Cabinet members had been instructed to talk to the members of the British group and that it would be agreeable to me if they held full-dress discussions of all problems connected with raw-material shortages—that I hoped they would come up with something that could be approved before our Washington talks came to an end. I announced that I had asked Stuart Symington, chairman of our National Security Resources Board, to be chairman of the U.S. group of conferees and that their talks could start that same afternoon.

Shortly before we went into that morning meeting, Under Secretary Lovett called from the Pentagon, reporting that the radar screens of some air defense installations in the Far North were reporting large formations of unidentified planes approaching. Fighter planes were sent up to reconnoiter and alerts were flashed to air centers in New England and beyond. But about an hour later—while I was meeting with Attlee—Lovett notified me that the report had been in error. Some unusual disturbance in the Arctic atmosphere had thrown the radar off.

Our afternoon was devoted to discussion of the European situation, especially the matter of getting the countries of NATO to agree on an integrated military setup. The British were anxious to see such an arrangement come into being soon and renewed their arguments that American troops in Europe—even if they were green and had to be trained there—would serve better than anything else to stimulate European efforts. We agreed on the text of a letter to the French to persuade

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE MEMORANDUM

The President Dec 6, 1955

TIME	NAME	ANSWER
1204a	Dr. Smith Charleston SC	wiring
1215a	Dr. Luman Joplin Mo	wiring
310a	"Pat" Thompson Chicago	Drum propane
808a	Richard Powers Ames Iowa	ca
1042 ^a	Mrs Hazel B Butler Clarkburg Va	"Hutch's"
1235	Law P Mahoney Prospect after lunch	"320 DC"
140a	Lincoln White	"J"
1513	Leo Chestock N.Y.C.	"Van atta"
159	Johnny Melnick - Cal.	"Will water"
3	Per Clyde Atkrocks Cold Water	"Will water"
310	Mrs R. Schreath - Cer. Ohio Ref Marshall	
5-	Chas Murphy - N.Y.	"
510	Betty Acheson - Out	"
550	Mary Fuller Erie Pa -	Co.
636P	Decker (Chilson) Brantley Cal.	WC AM
825P	Antoinette Clark - San Fran	wiring
1010P	John S. Long Baltimore Md	not avail
1027P	Paul Huey - Alliquippa Pa	not avail

MR. AYERS'
PRESS AND RADIO CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 6, 1950
AT 10.55 AM EST
WEDNESDAY

Q. Good morning, Eben.

MR. AYERS: Good morning, Bob and everybody. I haven't a great deal this morning. You know that the meeting is being held at 11:30 here. We will try to fill you in afterwards as we have before.

Q. That should be a comparatively brief meeting today, shouldn't it?

MR. AYERS: Yes.

Q. He is speaking at 12.30 at the Press Club.

Q. In view of the necessary brevity of the meeting this morning, do you expect that they will meet again this afternoon?

MR. AYERS: I can't tell you yet.

(Mr. Stephen Early came into the room)

I should like to introduce to you Mr. Steve Early, if there's anyone here who doesn't know him, and I doubt if there is. Steve is to come in at the request of the President in an emergency -- temporary capacity -- and do at these meetings with the British that which Charlie, as you know, was handling, and of course didn't have an opportunity to finish. And Steve will take over and help out on that. Correct, Steve?

MR. EARLY: That is my understanding.

Q. Just during the course of the meetings, Steve?

MR. EARLY: It is just temporary in the emergency, and as you saw me here yesterday and I told you that was a completely social visit, so it was. And it was not until 11 o'clock last night that I was called and asked to come in this morning -- asked to come in on a temporary basis to take the story that Eben just said Charlie did not have an opportunity to finish and carry it through to the end; that is, with particular reference to the discussions now under way with the British -- Prime Minister Attlee.

Q. Did the President call you, Steve?

MR. EARLY: Yes.

MR. AYERS: I had told them, Steve, that after the meeting today we would probably have something similar to what we have had before -- briefing them on the meeting, and that's about ---

MR. EARLY: (interposing) Another point, let me say -- my purpose will be, as it was before in the old days, to get as complete a story for you, under the limitations that are imposed at the present time because of the status of the discussions as possible. I will make every effort to do that. I remind you of the limitations.

Q. I think all our callers are identified?

MR. AYERS: They are all self-explanatory, and other than that I have nothing so far this morning.

Q. Do we have the personnel of those who are attending?

MR. AYERS: We will have them, as we have had them before for you.

Q. Do you have any nominations today?

MR. AYERS: Not that I know of.

Q. Any arrangements on Charlie's funeral?

MR. AYERS: Only tentative. As I told you last night, they were awaiting the arrival of his son, Walter, from St. Louis, but tentatively it is set for tomorrow afternoon, privately at the home.

Q. His sister-in-law called me up awhile ago and said it was 2:30 tomorrow afternoon, private.

MR. AYERS: Definitely.

MYRTLE BERGHEIM: She called me and said that anyone who wants to can go to the home after four o'clock today, but private at 2:30 tomorrow.

Q. The services are private?

MYRTLE: Yes.

MR. EARLY: A little add to that, I heard this morning -- I understood that there were to be -- request from the family -- for no flowers.

MR. AYERS: Yes. I told them that.

Q. We understood that.

Q. We understood that.

MR. EARLY: I didn't know.

Q. In lieu of that make contributions to the Arthritis Foundation.

MR. AYERS: I was going to say that.

MR. EARLY: I didn't know you had said that, I was held up out there.

Q. Will the President go to the services tomorrow afternoon?

MR. AYERS: Yes, he will go.

Q. He will attend the private services?

MR. AYERS: Undoubtedly.

KAY HOLLOWAY: Mr. Ayers, Roberta just called and said there will be two meetings with Attlee today, the other one at 3:30. She asks that you announce that.

MR. AYERS: Yes.

3

Q. Both in the White House?

Q. 3:30?

MR. AYERS: 3:30.

Q. Same group?

MR. AYERS: I don't know the personnel yet. I don't know whether there will be any changes or not, but conceivably there might be some, but I just don't know yet.

Q. Thank you, Eb.

AND THEN AT 12.17 PM EST (MR. EARLY)

Q. Hello, Steve. Both very sorry and happy to see you sitting there.

MR. EARLY: Well, ---

Q. (interposing) Start over, Steve.

MR. EARLY: I hadn't started. Hello, Smitty. You gentlemen know who attended?

Q. We have the list.

MR. EARLY: Yes. And what time, and they are now adjourning.

I am authorized to give you this Statement, which I think really is good. I think it covers.

The discussion centered on the economic problems arising from the mutual defense efforts with particular reference to raw material requirements. It was agreed that the problem of raw material shortages was vitally urgent, and that vigorous efforts should be made to increase production.

And for your guidance, gentlemen, and not as from me, that "increase production" is very important. I would underscore that a little.

Q. Meaning military production, Steve?

MR. EARLY: Well, it works two ways. What is needed for the military is needed for the economy.

Q. Sure.

MR. EARLY: (continuing with statement) -- made to increase production and to assure the most effective use of the limited supplies available. A wide area of agreement was apparent and a working party -- that means a staff force -- was established -- or appointed -- established, I have

it -- to explore the matter further. That ends the formal Statement.

Now, further for your guidance, those working parties or staff meetings will begin this afternoon immediately. The President designated the principal Government heads of the principal government agencies concerned -- departments -- departments and agencies -- to meet with representatives of the British government who will be designed by the Prime Minister; and I think they will get under way by two o'clock.

Q. Where?

MR. EARLY: Probably right here. And then later, at 3:30, Mr. Attlee and the President will meet again for a continuation of their discussion.

Q. Steve, this reference to raw material shortages and how we ought to increase production, does that mean increase production of raw materials or increase production of manufactured goods?

MR. EARLY: Both. But the emphasis today, I would say, was on the raw material -- the mining.

Q. In other words --

MR. EARLY (adding) --- the production.

Q. (continuing) ---the President and the Prime Minister agreed today today on a program for increased production by both countries?

MR. EARLY: Well, they are working on it. In general, I would say that there was agreement between them, but that is on the policy rather than on the detail.

Q. The mechanics?

MR. EARLY: Yes, the mechanics.

Q. Are they working on a plan for allocating raw materials between this country and other countries?

MR. EARLY: You really have got to get them before you can allocate them.

Q. There have been reports from London --

MR. EARLY: (adding) Increased production is the thing that I want.

Yes, Felix?

Q. There have been reports from London that Great Britain faces great shortages of many raw materials, in fact some of these published reports go on to list the different items in which Britain has shortages. Is this -- is that matter ---

MR. EARLY: (interposing) Well, the statement was made to that effect at the meeting and it was also pointed out in return that we face many shortages and very critical ones, and that together they may find a solution or get on the road to a solution.

Q. Was it part of the question of prices and production --

MR. EARLY: (interposing) No.

Q. (continuing) --- Rubber in Malaya?

MR. EARLY: I don't think I should go into the items. I would rather not.

Q. Steve, does this head toward ---

MR. EARLY: (adding) But you know that we have our shortages, and that rubber is one of them.

Q. Is this heading anyway toward a pooling -- a mutual pooling of resources?

MR. EARLY: This is too broad for that. It hasn't gotten down to the mechanics of it.

Q. Did I understand you to say no to prices, that it was not discussed, prices was not discussed?

MR. EARLY: No. There is no discussion of prices per se, no.

Q. Steve, before we break we assume there will be a similar briefing after the afternoon conference?

MR. EARLY: I hope so. We will try.

Q. Fine, thank you.

Q. Thank you, Steve.

Q. Thank you, sir.

AND AT 4:42 PM EST

MR. EARLY: I have rough drafts here of two statements. The first refers to the working parties that were meeting. The staff meeting called at 2:30 this afternoon continued until 4:15. Not a bulletin in that.

At this meeting there were mutually satisfactory and constructive discussions with respect to the necessary defense over-all economies of the two countries, especially as to raw materials. The statement that I gave you this morning, which was the subject of the discussions of the general meeting, if read in the light with this, I think is more helpful than this alone. You had better refer back to the statement I gave you this morning. And no individual problems were taken up, and for your information, they refer to -- that refers to the specific materials in long demand and short supply. Now, going back to the language of the statement: A number of individual problems were taken up and will be discussed further by smaller groups. I am parenthetically now explaining that -- in other words, they are taking these items and putting the experts of each item on the job. That means by smaller groups -- in parenthesis -- of the staff -- end of parenthesis. Another over-all meeting will be held tomorrow afternoon --

of the working group. In other words, the smaller groups -- the task forces -- will report back by tomorrow afternoon to the over-all group. Then the over-all group will be convened again. And the second statement refers to the meeting between the President, the Prime Minister, and their respective staffs, and reads as follows: Prime Minister Attlee and President Truman held their fourth meeting in the Cabinet Room of the White House this afternoon, from 3:30 until 4:25 -- 4:35. There was a full discussion of problems relating to the defense of the North Atlantic community. The Prime Minister and the President are in full agreement on the necessity of carrying out urgently plans and programs developed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They agreed that along with the other members of NATO -- North Atlantic Treaty Organization -- abbreviated NATO, they would go forward with energy in building up the military strength of the Atlantic community. That ends both statements.

Q. Steve, will there be a meeting of the principals tomorrow?

MR. EARLY: There probably will be, but I don't know that any time has been set as yet for them.

Q. Is the President going to the reception of the Prime Minister this afternoon?

MR. EARLY: Yes.

Q. He has left the office, but do you know if he is going directly to the reception.

MR. EARLY: No, I don't, Smitty, no. I only know that he is going because I heard him say as the conference adjourned, that he would see him in a few minutes.

Q. Did you ever tell us whether this agreement on energetically carrying out all the plans agreed upon (assumes) an agreement on a Supreme Commander -- Allied Commander? (assures) (?)

MR. EARLY: I would take it that it could. Energetically, or "with energy" -- the phrase "with energy" would mean that there is an acceleration, a speeding up.

Q. Nothing more specific than that on a Commander?

MR. EARLY: Let me go off the record a second, that two nations sitting here won't decide it for all.

Q. Can you add anything about Korea, Steve?

MR. EARLY: No. No, except to remind you, as you well know, that the recent developments there are quite a factor in the solution -- or rather let me put it this way -- add difficulties to the solution of the NATO problem. You see what I mean?

Q. What?

Q. NATO.

Q. NATO.

Q. Nothing on the military situation as such, Steve?

MR. EARLY: That is fairly military, I would think.

Q. I mean the -- I mean the actuality --

MR. EARLY: (interposing) Not in Korea.

Q. (continuing) --- the ground situation in Korea?

MR. EARLY: No. No. I misunderstood you.

Q. The diplomacy in the UN isn't military?

MR. EARLY: You will have to clarify me a little.

Q. Well, what they are going to do in the UN?

MR. EARLY: Yes, but I am speaking a little differently -- speaking now of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Q. Steve, there is a story being played all day --

MR. EARLY: (adding) Do I make it clear? I beg your pardon?

Q. There is a story being played all day in New York and here in the Scripps-Howard papers that they are in agreement that MacArthur shall have -- make the decision whether he is to stay there or not, that it is up to him. Is there anything you could say on that?

MR. EARLY: That they are? My knowledge only began this morning, and I will try to guide you, but I would like to do it off the record, if I can. Just for strict guidance, I don't think General MacArthur's name was mentioned in any of the discussions today.

Q. To date?

MR. EARLY: Today.

Q. Today.

MR. EARLY: I can't go beyond today. I was only projected into this this morning.

Q. His story was written last night.

MR. EARLY: That I wouldn't know about. I don't know.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Early.

Q. Thanks, Steve.